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About 
 
Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 
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Understanding Reforms in Macedonia 
Macedonia was the least developed of the republics  of the former SFR Yugoslavia, 
accounting for roughly 5.5 percent of output and 7 percent of total population. The 
Macedonian economy was strongly integrated with those of the other republics and 
depended heavily on the overall performance. Yugoslav economy had fallen into deep 
recession in the mid- 1980s, including high international indebtedness, high inflation that in 
1989 was transformed into hyperinflation, and high unemployment. Having in mind that 
more than 75 percent of goods were sold on the inter-republican markets, the production of 
non-tradable goods was high. The stagflation was persisting for a decade before the 
break-up of the former Yugoslavia. At independence, the Macedonian economy had been 
contracting for more than six years, inflation was at hyperinflation level and unemployment 
stood at about 24 percent. Furthermore, the country was not internationally recognized, 
almost without foreign exchange reserves and isolated from international financial markets.  
 
 
1  Stabilization policies and output development  
1.1 Monetary independence, stabilization and early transition 
The monetary independence followed after the referendum of September 8, 1991, when 
the citizens of the country voted for an independent state with modern market economy. 
The monetary order in the Republic of Macedonia was set up on April 26, 1992.  
 
The Macedonian currency was issued in the form of coupons. The rate of exchange of 
Yugoslav Dinar for Macedonian Denar was 1:1. It was born in a hyperinflationary 
environment (monthly rate of inflation above 50 percent) emanating from the money 
overhang and monetization of federal government deficit of former Yugoslavia. 
Furthermore, the Denar was born as a pure paper currency that was not backed either by 
gold or foreign exchange reserves. Namely, with the break-up of former Yugoslavia, 
international reserves remained at the Central Bank of former Yugoslavia. 
 
 
1.2 First stabilization effort 
Simultaneously with the introduction of the Macedonian currency, stabilization programme 
of orthodox-heterodox nature was launched. The establishment of the monetary order and 
introduction of the stabilization policies were carried out in very unfavourable environment. 
The Republic of Macedonia was still struggling for its’ international recognition and United 
Nations membership, due to which the assistance from the international financial 
institutions (IMF, World Bank) was impossible. Military conflicts among some ex-
Yugoslavian Republics were underway, which severely affected access of the Macedonian 
companies to international markets. United Nations embargo was imposed against 2 
Yugoslavia, north neighbouring country of Macedonia
1. Thus, high political risk hindered 
the inflow of private capital and borrowing from commercial banks. Furthermore, the top 
political leadership was mainly preoccupied with activities related to recognition and 
isolating of the country from the inter-republican conflicts that were getting momentum.  
 
The macroeconomic stabilization started without explicit social partnership agreement. 
However, the implicit consensus was the referendum that took place in September 1991. 
The programme was designed by a distinguished team of economists under the leadership 
of the President Gligorov, who enjoyed very high reputation and confidence from both the 
citizens and leaders of political parties. However, the President and other top political 
leaders were not free to focus primarily on economic reforms, which meant that they could 
not supervise the bureaucracy closely and make sure that the bureaucrats assisted rather 
than hindered the stabilization efforts. 
 
The main goal of the stabilization policies was the two digit monthly rate of inflation to be 
reduced to one digit rate of inflation.  
 
Although the country did not have international reserves, fixed exchange rate regime was 
assessed as the most appropriate, due to the low credibility of fiscal, financial and 
monetary institutions (Calvo, Mishkin, 2003, p. 16)
2. The fixed exchange rate was selected 
in order to discipline the demand management policies but also as an instrument for 
gaining credibility. The prices, except for the goods and services of basic necessities, 
energy, transport, communications and public utilities, were fully liberalized. The controlled 
prices accounted for 25 percent of total prices. 
 
The rate of inflation had started falling with time lag of a month. In June the monthly rate of 
inflation was reduced to 17 percent from 72.4 percent in May. The deceleration of inflation 
                                                                 
1   During the whole decade of transition, Macedonian economy was exposed to severe political shocks out of which four 
external and one internal. The first external shock was the hostile break-up of former SFR Yugoslavia in October 1991. 
The international reserves were seized on the federal level at the National Bank of former Yugoslavia and Central 
Banks of the new states were established without any stock of foreign exchange reserves. In the Macedonian case the 
domestic market had shrunk from 20 million citizens to 2 million citizens. The second external shock were international 
sanctions against the north neighboring country – the Federal republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) 
imposed in 1992 (and ban on transshipment of products through the country 1993) were partly lifted in 1995. Third 
external shock was the trade blockade from the south neighboring country Greece in the period April 1994 – November 
1995. Kosovo crisis in 1999 represents the fourth external shock that hit the Republic of Macedonia. The conflict in 
Kosovo pushed about 350,000 refugees across the border into Macedonia, the equivalent of 17 percent of the country’s 
population. Simultaneously new sanctions from international community were imposed against Yugoslavia (now Serbia 
and Montenegro). The sanctions were lifted after the fall of Milosevic regime – October 2001. Finally, the internal 
conflict in 2001, which ended with signing of the peace agreement known as the Ohrid agreement.  
2   “If an emerging market country is able to develop fiscal, financial and monetary institutions that provide credibility for 
society’s pursuit of price stability, then monetary policy can be used to stabilize the economy. Still, not all-emerging 
market countries are up to this task, and so they may decide to choose a hard exchange rate peg instead. (However, 
the absence of strong institutions may make it difficult for them to sustain hard peg.)” – Guillemo A. Calvo, Frederic S. 
Mishkin, The Mirage of exchange rate regimes for emerging market countries, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper 9808, June 2003, p. 16. 3 
continued in July (8.3 percent) and August (6.6 percent). This was mainly outcome of the 
deceleration of money supply growth from 73.3 percent in April to 13.9 percent in May and 
9.7 percent in June 1992, and impact of heterodox elements. 
 
However, unskilled and unprofessional bureaucracy that was not effectively supervised by 
top political leaders together with strong groups from agricultural and industrial sector at 
the end of August 1992 succeeded to change the main elements of the stabilization 
programme. The Central Bank was pressed to relax the monetary policy by securing funds 
for financing the crop of wheat and tobacco through activation of the so-called selective 
function of the monetary policy
3. Simultaneously, the main heterodox element, wage 
freeze was abolished, allowing wage increase in the economic sector by 65 percent, and in 
the non-economic sector by 141 percent. The two digit monthly rate of inflation was back 
on the horizon. The exchange rate was devalued on October 10, 1992 by 66.7 percent and 
pegged against basket of currencies.  
 
Graph 1 
Monthly growth rates of money supply (M1), consumer prices and  











New higher goal for the rate of inflation was set up. Monetary policy target was 
accommodated to this goal. In December 1992 the exchange rate was devalued again by 
26.7 percent. Thus, the year ended with the inflation rate of 1,925 percent (450 percent in 
the period May – December 1992), money supply grew at 704.5 percent, fiscal deficit was 
9.8 percent and gross domestic product decreased by 6.6 percent. 
 
                                                                 
3   Despite to control monetary and credit growth the central bank had selective function as well. This meant that the 
central bank had to direct credit to support certain agricultural and export activities. Such activities were undermining 
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Table 1 
Selected economic indicators, 1992 to 1993 














1992  2,408.4  1,925.2  755.1  704.5  - 9.8  - 6.6  23.6 
1993  434.2  229.6  268.3  239.7  -13.4  - 7.5  24.9 
 
The main contributions of the stabilization programme were the acceptance of the 
Macedonian Denar as a legal tender and the establishment of the new monetary order in 
the Republic of Macedonia.  
 
As a consequence of the pressures from different interest groups, in 1993, the goal for 
inflation was set up very high (434.2 percent), and the target for money supply 268.3 
percent. Wages were fully liberalized. However, the inflation was lower than the projected. 
Fiscal deficit was increased by 3.6 percentage points in comparison to the previous year 
and reached 13.4 percent. The contraction of the economy continued which was reflected 
into increased unemployment (24.9 percent). 
 
From May 10
th to November 30th, 1993 the substitution of coupons with definite paper 
currency took place. The exchange of coupons to paper currency was in a ratio of 100 : 1. 
This facilitated the monetary authorities to gain control over money supply growth. 
Simultaneously, reforms  of monetary policy instruments were initiated. The so-called 
selective function of the Central Bank (direct allocation of credits to some economic 
activities) was reduced significantly. This function was fully phased out until the end of 
March 1994. In order to satisfy the rent seeking groups from agriculture the stock of the 
existing selective credits was transformed into interest free long-term loans (maturity of 15 
years). 
 
On April 8, 1993 Macedonia become a member of the United Nations. Accordingly, it 
became member of the World Bank in March 1993, and member of International Monetary 
Fund in April 1993. These enabled Macedonia to become eligible for cooperation and 
assistance from the international multilateral financial institutions. However, high political 




1.3 Second stabilization effort 
Comprehensive stabilization policies with deep structural reforms were initiated in 1994. 
The stabilization policies and reforms were for the first time supported by the IMF  – 
Systemic Transformation Facility, by International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD)  - Extended Recovery Loan and by International Development 5 
Association (IDA) – Extended Recovery Credit. The total amount of the approved support 
for reforms was Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 80.7 million.  
 
The IMF has had leading role in designing and monitoring the implementation of 
stabilization and structural adjustment policies. The role of IMF was threefold. First, IMF 
substituted the lack of strong political base, “visionary and authoritarian leadership”, and 
non-existence of coherent economic team. Second, IMF contributed to creation of 
consensus among different interest groups and political parties. Third, the IMF was free to 
focus on economic goals and had undertaken the role of top political leaders to supervise 
the bureaucracy. Furthermore, IMF through a lot of training courses contributed to creation 
of a team of skilled bureaucracy that is able to design and implement macroeconomic 
policies.  
 
The main features of the stabilization programme from 1994 were: monetary and fiscal 
restrain, regime of pre-announced crawling peg against the DEM and partial indexation of 
wages to the rate of inflation.  
 
The inflation rate was reduced to 55.4 percent in 1994, to 9.2 percent in 1995 and since 
the beginning of 1996 the rate of inflation was brought to the EU countries level.  
 
The reforms of the instruments of monetary policy and increased legal and functional 
independence, enabled the Central Bank to gain full control over money and credit. In the 
period January 1994  – September 1995 the Central Bank was implementing monetary 
targeting strategy as a tool for reducing and controlling inflation. Since the fourth quarter of 
1995 the Central Bank started de facto with the implementation of exchange rate targeting 
strategy. The fixed exchange rate of Denar against German Deutsche Mark was selected 
as main monetary target. However, this was not reflected in the official announcements of 
the monetary targets. The Central Bank continued officially to announce monetary 
aggregates as main targets. Official announcement of the exchange rate as monetary 
target started since 1997. Simultaneously the Central Bank has continued with disclosure 
of targets for the growth of monetary aggregates (see table 2 in Appendix). This, to some 
extent has been creating confusion among economic agents in respect to which is the 
leading monetary target. Simultaneously, this was giving an incentive to some interest 
groups to put considerable pressure against the Central Bank to deliver the disclosed 
monetary growth in cases when there was conflict between the target of stability of the 
exchange rate and disclosed monetary growth. However, the exchange rate targeting 
strategy harmonized the growth rates of monetary aggregates to the ones in the anchor 
currency country - Germany. Since 2002 the anchor currency has become Euro, and the 
EU as anchor currency area.  
 6 
Graph 2 
Money supply growth rates: M1, M2, 
rate of inflation, and exchange rate of the denar against the euro 
 
 












1.4 Structural aspects of public finance 
1.4.1  Fiscal consolidation 
The fixed exchange rate regime disciplined the fiscal policy as well. The fiscal adjustment 
was considerable. The fiscal deficit was reduced from 13.4 percent in 1993 to 2.7 percent 
in 1994. The fiscal prudence has become permanent feature during the whole period of 
transition. The fiscal deficit in the period 1995 - 1998 was moderate, not higher than 
2 percent. In addition, moderate surplus was recorded in 2000. Exceptions were the years 
of internal conflict 2001 and the election year of 2002, when due to high expenditures 
connected with the internal conflict the fiscal deficit increased to 7.2 percent and 
5.7 percent, respectively. Severe fiscal adjustment has been in place in 2003, which was 
reflected in reducing the deficit to 1.7 percent (see tables 3, and 4 in the Appendix). 
 
Most of the fiscal adjustment was accomplished through  expenditure cutting policies. 
Reductions in subsidies, capital expenditures and pension payments accounted for over 
half of the total expenditure cuts. Lower interest payments after the restructuring of external 
debt in 1995 and 1996 also contributed significantly. Although during the Kosovo crisis the 
fiscal expenditures were increased by 8 percent in order to cover the costs for hosting 
340.000 refugees from Kosovo (17 percent of Macedonian population), thanks to better 
economic performance than expected and inflows of foreign assistance the fiscal budget in 
1999 remain balanced. The fiscal balance was threatened in 2001 and 2002, again. The 












post conflict costs affected fiscal expenditures, as well. The contraction of expenditures in 
2003 overshoot the projections, which led to fiscal deficit of 1.7%. 
 
Graph 3 
Structure of fiscal expenditure, 1996 to 2003 












1.4.2  Public expenditures 
Final c onsumption expenditures and transfers account for 90 percent of fiscal 
expenditures. Capital expenditures account for 7.9 percent of fiscal expenditures, only. 
They are lagging behind in comparison to the levels in other transitional economies. The 
quality of expenditures is not contributing to acceleration of the economic growth. The 
budget’s economic composition remained ill suited for promoting economic growth. High 
transfers, although lower than in other transition economies, in the matured stage of 
transition is an evidence for high poverty, unemployment and large number of losers that 
need compensation in order to preserve social peace. In the coming years, in order to 
promote economic growth, through better fiscal management, qualitative changes in the 
structure of the budget are becoming an imperative. The share of capital expenditures 
should increase significantly on behalf of final consumption. The level of transfers should 
resemble to the values compatible for low-income country.  
 
Government expenditures are lower in Macedonia compared with other economies in 
transition as a result of a significant fiscal adjustment. Public spending declined from 45.8 
percent of GDP in 1994 to 34.2 percent in 2000, although it temporarily ballooned during 








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
est.
capital expenditures final consumption transfers8 
Table 2 
Fiscal structure of economies in transition, average for 1997 to 2001 
 
 
As to the structure of expenditures, non-discretionary outlays excluding interest payments 
(consisting of wages and social transfers) are slightly over 60 percent of total expenditures. 
A largest single component is “wages and salaries”, at 8.0 percent in the period 1997-
2001,which reflects that employment in central government administration accounts for 
almost 2 percent of population, almost twice the level in other low- and middle income 
countries and higher than in many transition economies. It is often the case that 
immediately before elections there is a rapid increase in the number of employees in the 
government administration (but also in some public enterprises), which means that ruling 
parties use public employment as a way to influence the elections results. On the contrary, 
social transfers are considerably lower than in other transition economies, which certainly 
reduces public support for economic reforms. According to the literature on policy reform 
(Williamson, 1994;Rodrik, 1996) reforms become easier if losers are compensated. 
 
However, the fiscal system was not structured to promote growth, to deliver fear 
compensation of unemployed losers, to tax e conomic agents achieving considerable 
gains, and to de-stimulate tax evasion and gray activity (For more details see L. Kaplow, 
NBER WP, April 2003). 
 
Another structural weakness is very low level of capital expenditures, which are only half 
the level of other transition economies. This implies that fiscal policy has been focused 




Macedonia Bulgaria Czech 
Republic
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovak 
Republic
Slovenia Average
Total Revenue and Grants 34.9 38.3 39.5 38.2 44.7 37.9 32.0 41.5 31.4 38.4 43.0 38.2
Total Revenue and Grants 34.4 37.5 39.4 37.9 44.6 38.3 31.9 41.7 32.4 38.4 43.0 38.1
  Tax Revenue 32.0 29.2 36.4 33.7 37.5 32.5 30.0 35.0 28.3 33.3 40.1 33.5
    -taxes on income and profits 5.5 8.1 8.8 9.7 9.1 8.2 8.8 8.8 6.9 8.0 7.7 8.1
    -social security taxes 11.2 7.6 14.8 10.6 11.8 10.2 7.7 11.8 9.7 12.7 13.8 11.1
    -domestic taxes on g&s 11.3 11.2 11.6 12.9 14.1 12.6 12.4 12.0 9.2 10.8 15.0 12.1
    -taxes on international trade 3.3 1.3 0.7 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1
    -other taxes 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.3 1.1 0.6 1.5 1.2 0.6 2.3 1.0
  Nontax revenue 2.2 7.8 2.6 3.4 6.0 5.1 1.8 6.0 3.5 4.4 2.6 4.1
Capital revenue 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.5
Grants 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 -1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Total Expenditures 36.1 36.6 41.3 37.3 48.5 39.7 34.3 43.3 34.5 42.1 44.0 39.8
Current expenditures 33.5 34.3 37.3 34.8 43.3 35.3 31.4 41.5 31.3 36.8 39.5 36.3
  Wages and salaries 8.0 6.1 3.8 6.8 9.1 8.2 8.9 8.3 5.5 6.4 9.8 7.4
  Goods and services 4.3 9.8 4.8 12.6 7.4 8.4 10.0 9.0 7.2 5.0 8.4 7.9
  Interest payments 1.8 4.8 1.1 0.4 7.2 1.0 1.4 3.1 3.9 2.8 1.4 2.6
  Subsidies and current transfers 14.6 13.5 27.6 14.9 19.6 17.7 11.1 21.1 13.7 22.6 20.0 17.9
Capital expenditures 2.3 3.9 5.5 4.0 6.7 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.1 5.4 4.6 4.3
Overall Deficit/Surplus -1.2 1.7 -1.8 0.9 -3.8 -1.8 -2.3 -1.8 -3.1 -3.7 -1.0 -1.69 
1.4.3  Public revenues 
Since independence, revenue collection has been buoyant and revenue to GDP ratios 
have remained high, relative to comparable emerging economies. However, general 
government revenues declined significantly between 1992 and 1998 from 40.5 to 
33.3 percent of GDP, which represents a moderate fiscal burden. The introduction of VAT 
in 2000, boost revenues again to 36.7 percent of GDP and created room for a reduction in 
personal income taxes, introduced in 2001. 
 
As regards the structure of revenues, it is broadly in line with other transition economies. 
Two main and almost equally important sources of revenues are sales taxes(VAT and 
excises) and labour-based taxes(social contributions and personal income 
tax).Interestingly, while the IMF often argues that Macedonia relies too much on labour 
income taxation, the World Bank finds that: “At below 17 percent of GDP, taxes and 
contributions on employment as a share of GDP are below levels elsewhere, and they 
have been declining, although this is mostly because of shrinking formal sector 
employment rather than lower labour costs” (World Bank, 2003a, p. 20). 
 
Contrary to other transition economies, presented in Table 2, tariffs are important source of 
revenue in Macedonia. Despite that, either because of tariff exemptions or because of tariff 
evasion due to corruption and weak customs administration, actual tariff collections are far 
below potential to what the average tariff rates suggest they should be.  
 
 
1.5 International financial assistance 
The stabilization and reforms in Macedonia have been supported considerably by the 
international multilateral financial institutions. However, the inflow of private capital was 
moderate. The cooperation with IMF and World Bank during the transition was permanent. 
In the period 1994 – 2002, Macedonia used funds from IMF, in amount of USD 129.3 
million, having six arrangements. USD 341.6 million were contributed from World Bank 
Group for structural reforms, USD 67 million were used funds from International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and USD 274.6 million were used funds under IDA 
terms. The country ceased to be eligible for IDA in July 2001. 
 
The funds from international financial institutions were not followed by the private capital 
inflows. Especially the foreign direct investments were modest. Experience in other 
transition economies and in the developing world points to the importance of foreign direct 
investment in energizing economic growth. Macedonia was not attractive location for 
foreign investors. The main reasons were unfavourable regional environment until 2000 
and the internal conflict in 2001. Low return on equity and return on assets had made 
Macedonia unattractive for foreign investors. The cumulative inflow of foreign direct 10 
investments in Macedonia at the end of 2002 was USD 905 million or 24.3 percent of GDP 
or USD 442 per head (see table 6 in the Appendix). This level is close to the regional 
average for South Eastern Europe, but only a fraction of the levels achieved by the more 
successful transition economies (see table 7 in the Appendix). As a result, the share of 
foreign-controlled companies is limited, accounting for only 10 to 15 percent of total value-
added in the economy in 2001 and employing less than 5 percent of workers. 
 
 
1.6 Transition costs and renewal of economic growth  
In the beginning of the transition it was generally expected that output would fall at the start 
of the reform process, as a result of both macroeconomic stabilization and the reallocation 
of resources from unproductive sectors to sectors that would be profitable at world prices
4. 
Table No. 3 shows that this happened in all transition economies. In Macedonia output 
declined for five consecutive years with a cumulative decline of 21.2 percent. The duration 
of transition recession was longer than the average duration in the countries of Central and 
South Eastern Europe and the Baltics. Primarily this was result of long disinflationary 
process (four and half years) and unfavourable external environment. However, the 
cumulative contraction of the output was equal to the average decline.  
 
Table 3 
The transition recession 






       
Macedonia  5  21.2  91.2 
Central and South Eastern Europe  
and the Baltics 
3.8  22.6  106.5 
     of which:       
    Albania  3  33.0  110.0 
    Bulgaria  4  16.0  81.0 
    Croatia  4  36.0  87.0 
    Romania  3  21.0  144.0 
    Slovenia  3  14.0  105.0 
CIS countries  6.5  50.5  62.7 
Source: World Bank (2002e) and Bank staff calculation     
 
The growth was renewed in 1996, but it remained weak. The economic growth depended 
on the speed and comprehensiveness of structural reforms and internal and external 
political environment. The structural reforms of enterprise and financial sector were slow. 
                                                                 
4   See for more details in Stanley Fisher, Ratna Sahay, The Transition Economies After Ten Years, International 
Conference Paper, Warsaw, October 15-16, 1999, pp. 1–4. 11 
The performance of institutions and rule of law were weak. These obstacles did not 
allowed swift reallocation of resources from unproductive sectors to sectors that would be 
profitable at world prices. Growth was not sufficient to reduce significantly the high 
unemployment (average rate of 33 percent in the period 1996 - 2003), which required high 
fiscal transfers in order to preserve social peace, during whole transition period. The 2001 
civil conflict disrupted the momentum of economic development. However swift resolution 
of conflict in August 2001 through signing the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
(the Ohrid Agreement)
5 limited the direct damage of the conflict. In 2001 output contracted 
by 4.5 percent. Contraction was stopped in 2002. Sustainable economic recovery started 
in 2003, in which GDP increased by 3.1 percent. 
 
 
1.7 The role of savings and investment in promoting growth  
The structure of the consumption was not favourable for promoting high long-term 
economic growth. The demand management policies were mainly oriented to maintain 
price stability, and not to change the structure of consumption in order to promote high 
economic growth and employment. Total investments and especially investments in fixed 
assets, which are motor of the high sustainable growth, were l ow. Furthermore, the 
investments in fixed assets as share of GDP have been moderately falling since 1997. The 
fall was significant in the internal conflict year – 2001. In 2002 they were equal to their 1997 
level (17.3 percent). Although, gross national savings was permanently increasing since 
1997 it was not enough to support sustainable high economic growth. Record was 
achieved in 2000 (23.2 percent of GDP). The gross national savings significantly fell as a 
result of severe contraction in 2001. In 2003 the gross national savings slightly increased to 
15.6 percent of GDP.  
                                                                 
5   The General Framework Agreement for Peace (the Ohrid Agreement) was signed on August 13, 2001 by the leaders of 
the four main political parties in Macedonia at that time, representing ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. It set 
out specific reforms and protections aimed at strengthening the rights of minority communities, especially ethnic 
Albanians. The Ohrid Agreement institutes a minority veto over certain categories of legislation, including laws that 
directly affect culture, use of language, education, local government and personal documentation, and provides for 
affirmative action in public employment. The agreement also mandates the increased use of the Albanian language in 
public affairs and decentralization of the responsibility for many government functions to the municipalities. 
  The amendments to the Constitution required by the Ohrid Agreement were adopted by the Parliament on November 
16, 2001. After considerable debate the new Law on Local Self – Government was adopted by the Assembly on 
January 24, 2002. The Law  assigns local governments responsibility for establishing and financing primary schools, 
providing social care for the disabled and other social categories, and providing primary health care and health 
protection for persons without health insurance. The transitional provisions of the law anticipate an implementation 
period of two years, specifying that existing sector-specific laws should be harmonized by the end of 2003. 
  An important aspect of the Ohrid Agreement from an economic perspective is that it includes a commitment to create 
“equitable” representation of minorities in the public administration, addressing present imbalances. This will require the 
employment of under represented minorities, which will be difficult to fulfill while containing wage spending. This 
challenge will be amplified by the need to decompress wage structures in public employment. Improving the 
representation of minorities will also compound difficulties in implementing regulations intended to create a 
professional, merit-based civil service. The achievement of civil service reform objectives will be further complicated by 
the reduction in central government employment and increase in local government employment implied by 
decentralization. 12 
Graph 4 
Savings, investment and current account balance 
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Although low, domestic investments were higher than the domestic savings, during the 
whole transition period. In the period 1997 – 2002 the average gap was 5.3 percentage 
points. The gap has been covered by import of foreign savings and current account 
deficits. Thus, the domestic economic growth was dependent on the import of long term 
private capital, which was modest and the capacity of the banks efficiently to allocate the 
scarce domestic and foreign savings.  
 
Changing the structure of consumption, especially of the fiscal expenditures, would 
become high priority for policy-makers in order to promote growth. The recommendations 
for policy makers are twofold. First, on medium term, without import of foreign savings 
(capital), the Macedonia cannot become fast growing economy. On long run the propensity 
to save has to grow at higher pace than in the matured market economies. In order 
Macedonia to render into a group of fast growing economies, the domestic savings has to 
reach the threshold of 24 – 26 percent of GDP. Second, the need of import of foreign 
savings, on medium term will determine the country to be faced with considerable current 
account deficits. These deficits would be not possible to be cured by corrections of the 
foreign exchange rate, although policy of competitive exchange rate is inevitable ingredient 
for promoting high economic growth (Bishev, 2002). The alternative for policy makers 
would be to accept lower rates of economic growth and higher level of unemployment. 
Thus, for the coming years the main challenges for policy makers will be qualitative 
changes in the structure of fiscal expenditures and appropriate mix among domestic 
savings, current account deficit and the rate of economic growth. Competitive exchange 
rate policies are part of these challenges. Efficient allocation of domestic and foreign 
savings will play crucial role. The main test for the banking industry, as the spinum column 
of the financial sector, would be whether it would be sound and would have capacity to 
perform its historic role.  13 
1.8 Export-oriented growth a necessity 
Apart from domestic investment, the contribution of export to the economic development 
was not significant. As a small and open economy Macedonia is heavily dependent on 
international trade. The years of economic growth 1996 – 2000, are overlapping with the 
years of export growth. However, the export growth was very weak. Due to the 
unfavourable internal environment in 2001 and 2002 the export of goods and services was 
reduced to its pre-transitional level (1992). Contrary the more successful transition 
economies that are facing high economic growth and low unemployment (Slovenia, 
Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia) succeeded to triple their export during the 
transition decade (EBRD, Transition Report 2002, pp. 110 – 217). The Macedonia has to 
follow the same pattern of behaviour. This would require bold, swift and comprehensive 
structural reforms that would result in better allocation of resources from sectors producing 
non-tradable goods into export oriented sectors producing tradable goods and services.  
 
Graph 5 
Export, import and GDP levels 
























































2  Liberalization 
Macedonia introduced full current account convertibility in 1998 and government control of 
prices is limited only to the regulation of the state monopolies. Given the fact that foreign 
exchange and domestic price liberalization so far have proceeded smoothly and without 




2.1   Trade liberalization 
2.1.1  Trade policies 
Macedonia opted for a gradual approach in trade liberalization. It inherited a relatively 
liberal foreign-trade regime from SFRY. In 1996 a further liberalization and rationalization 
was carried out,  by lowering the average tariff rate (which fell to about 15 percent), 
eliminating all the quantitative restrictions and reducing the number of custom duty rates. In 
2001 the Tariff Law was changed and as a result a simple nominal average rate has been 
slightly decreased to 14.6 percent. Finally, Macedonia became WTO member in 2003, 
which means a significant step toward further foreign-trade liberalization because it 
assumes additional cuts in the nominal tariff rates. 
 
Besides that, government has pursued bilateral trade agreements as the principal vehicles 
fore trade liberalization, mainly with regional partners (Table 4). Multilateral agreements are 
also signed with the EU and EFTA. Although trade integration involves not only positive 
effects, but also some well-known costs, it seems that the positive ones are prevailing. The 
importance of regional trade integration isn’t limited only on trade flows. By free trade 
zones, Macedonia could overcome limitation of small domestic market, which is one of the 
constraints for more intensive inflow of foreign direct investment in the country. 
 
Table 4 
Bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements 
 
Bilateral agreements
signed  applied population 
in million
Slovenia 1996 1996 2.0
FR Yugoslavia 1996 1996 8.4
Croatia 1997 1997 4.5
Turkey 1999 2000 68.0
Bulgaria 1999 2000 8.2
Albania 2002 2002 3.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 2002 4.0
Ukraine 2000 2001 48.0





EU 2001 2001  
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It is interesting to note that Macedonia, with the smallest economy of the five SEE 
countries presented in the Table, has the highest average protection, which is according to 
Michalopolus (2003) ”a questionable distinction”.  Despite that, the IMF assesses 
Macedonia’s trade regime as open and liberal, with a rating of 2 on the Fund’s index of 
trade restrictiveness, which runs from 1 to 10. Macedonia also achieved a ‘4’ rating in 
EBRD rating on trade liberalization in 2002. 
 
Table 5 
Five SEE countries: average tariff rate 
  Simple average  Weighted average 
Macedonia  14.6% (2001)  14.2% (1999) 
Albania  7.2% (2002)  - 
Croatia  7.0% (2001)  6.13% (2001) 
Yugoslavia  9.2% (2001)  8.0% (2001) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  6.8 % (2001)  - 
 
There is no doubt that slow decline in the degree of tariff protection reflects, at least partly, 
the pressure of interest groups and business lobbies. But authorities had also some good 
reasons to avoid a rapid opening of the economy. First, since 1991, Macedonian foreign 
trade has suffered a number of adverse external shocks, plus the security crisis in 
2001.Second, large current and trade deficits have persisted during the whole period of 
transition. Third, Macedonian labour markets are inflexible, which implies that radical trade 
liberalization may not reallocate economy’s resources appropriately. 
 
 
2.1.2  Trade performance and external deficits  
Starting in 1994, with some temporary exceptions, a continuous widening of external 
deficits began, so that by 1998 the current account deficit widened to 8.8% of GDP and to 
over 10% of GDP in 2002.The growth of external deficits has primarily been caused by 
worsening of the trade balance. The value of imports of goods and services in the period 
1992-2000 grew by an average annual rate of 8.9 percent, while value of exports 
increased only 3.2 percent annually. 
 
Managers of domestic firms, trade unions, and some academic economists (for example, 
see Kostovska, 1998) have often blamed trade liberalization for the decline of domestic 
output and the rise in unemployment and in external deficits. They have argued that 
Macedonian companies that operated in highly protected environment during a socialist 
era cannot restructure themselves immediately and hence, they are not in a position to 
compete with foreign ones. Therefore, the argument proceeds, they need some transitory 
period of protection in order to implement restructuring measures. 
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However, there are several strong arguments against the critics of trade liberalization. First, 
the costs from liberalization appear only in a case of rapid liberalization. Given the four-
year delay in the liberalization process (initiated in 1996) and the modest decline in tariff 
rates, this is certainly not the case in Macedonia. Second, the decline of economic activity 
in Macedonia took place in the first half of 1990s, while trade liberalization efforts started in 
the second half. Third, large external shocks appear to be the primary cause of the 
recession and the abysmal export performance. Fourth, the widening of deficits and the 
decline of output can be partly explained by the significant real exchange appreciation in 
the first years of stabilization. 
 
Therefore, major weaknesses in enterprise and banking sectors, which are discussed 
below, remain the root cause of the low competitiveness at the side of Macedonian 
producers. To achieve rapid export growth both energetic reforms in the enterprise and 
banking sectors and sound macroeconomic policies will be needed. 
 
 
3  Structural reforms 
3.1 Privatization 
The Macedonian privatization started in 1990, when the last federal government introduced 
the Law on Social Capital. Under that law, enterprises could be corporatized and 
employees could purchase shares in their own firms(“internal shares”)-usually at a 
substantial discount to their market value. By mid 1991, roughly 67 large and medium-
sized enterprises in Macedonia had been fully privatized under the law and hundred more 
partially privatized (IMF, 1998). It is interesting to note that, compared to all other former 
Yugoslav republics, the process of distribution of these internal shares went furthest in 
Macedonia. As Slaveski(1997) points out, a small group of powerful managers of big 
socialist enterprises acted as a lobby and were capable of discouraging any move towards 
a suspension of The Law on Social Capital, before 18, 1991, when its legal validity expired. 
 
Not until June 1993 was the federal law replaced by the Law on the Transformation of 
Social Capital and only in late 1994 did the privatization process get started again. The 
new law was based upon the selling of enterprises on a case-by-case basis. Enterprises, 
i.e. the existing management were permitted to choose the method of privatization 
although their plan had to be approved by the Privatization Agency. 
 
The turning point in Macedonian privatization came when the authorities had realized that 
privatization of large enterprises might not be feasible, despite the generous concessions 
offered by the law(10 to 20 percent down payment and five year interest free credit).Since 
nobody showed interest in putting money on the table, authorities found an “original” 
solution: management teams from within enterprises were allowed to use their internal 17 
shares, obtained in previous privatization, as a down payment. Moreover, more internal 
shares might be used for securing the right to purchase the rest of the shares for up to at 
least 51 percent of the appraised value of the company in five annual interest-free 
instalments. This concession to insiders effectively blocked any outside party interested in 
offering an alternative development plan for a specific enterprise undergoing privatization 
(Slaveski,1997). Even when shares were made available to both insiders and outsiders 
(the buyout model), insiders tended to purchase the majority of stake as they had more 
information on the company and could benefit from discounts and the chance to purchase 
shares in instalments. 
 
By March 1998, roughly 87 percent (weighted by the number of employees) of privatized 
companies were purchased by insiders, including a number of different privatization forms. 
The low level of outsider, and particularly foreign, involvement in privatizations meant that 
privatized companies did not benefit from the injection of capital or know-how seen in many 
other transition economies. At 0.9 percent of GDP in 1997 Macedonia had the lowest level 
of foreign direct investment of any transition economy. The insider- dominated ownership 
had serious adverse implications for the corporate governance and restructuring, which are 
explained, in the next section.  
 
Slaveski (1997) concludes that Macedonian insider dominated privatization has probably 
emerged as an unintentional product of the strategic mistake of not combining the sell-off 
method with some of variants of mass privatization. While that is partly true, it is at the 
same time very likely that politicians in charge tried to use privatization as a way of 
strengthening their own position. Implementing the insider method, at one hand, they 
gained support from the powerful business lobby, given the fact that managers became 
main winners of the privatization. At the other hand, they might have hoped that employees 
would, at least ex ante, support reforms, in exchange for shares received  in the 
privatization process. 
 
It will be probably fair to say that the same privatization model applied in Macedonia would 
deliver better final results if the country had stronger institutions. The World Bank 
comments:”…the impact of privatization has been rather disappointing….most likely 
because of the dominance of insider buy-outs but also because improper procedures and 
substantial corruption during the process, discouraging new owners from investing in their 
new acquisitions because of uncertainty about property rights”(World Bank,2003a, 
p. 4).But it is also quite interesting that international financial institutions were more or less 
passive during the creation of the privatization law and in the early phase of its 
implementation. It seems that almost the only thing they were worried about was the speed 
of the process, obviously trying to secure the irreversibility of the ownership change. For 
example, the World Bank required privatization of 790 enterprises in 1995 alone, out of 
around 1,500 identified for privatization as one of conditions of the FESAK arrangement.  18 
3.2 Enterprise restructuring and governance 
Despite a large-scale privatization programme and significant foreign trade liberalization, 
Macedonia’s track record in enterprise reforms has b een weak. The persistence of 
payment and wage arrears and poor profitability in the enterprise sector suggest low 
corporate restructuring. This reflects first, a privatization process dominated by insider 
buyouts and second, unfavourable institutional framework for investment and restructuring 
(tolerance of soft budget constraints, weak legal protection for creditors, relatively inefficient 
banking system, large informal sector etc.).Yet, cross-country comparisons of profitability 
indicators show that Macedonia significantly reduced the gap with other transition 
economies in 2000, although net profits remained the lowest among the group of countries 
presented in Table 6 (Zalduendo – 2003) (During the recovery period 1997-2000,many 
other indicators of corporate performance-productivity, turnover of firms, concentration of 
losses-also witnessed a strong positive reversal). The 2001 civil conflict certainly made 




Profit and losses in transition economies 
(in percent of GDP, before taxes) 
 
1994 1997 2000 1994 1997 2000 1994 1997 2000
Bulgaria na 11.3 9.1 na -5.4 -8.0 4.5 6.0 1.0
Czech Republic 13.7 na na -5.7 na na 8.0 2.5 1.6
Macedonia 2.5 3.5 6.5 -14.5 -6.4 -5.9 -12.0 -2.9 0.7
Poland 10.0 8.8 7.4 -3.9 -2.9 -4.4 6.1 6.0 3.0
Slovak Republic 13.9 na na -7.2 na na 6.7 na 8.8
Slovenia 4.5 na na -6.4 na na -1.9 na na




3.2.1  Insider privatization 
It is now well understood that privatization that results in widely dispersed ownership 
structures can work well only in countries with effective standards of corporate governance 
(IMF, 2000). Macedonia obviously lacks such standards and at the same time, as we 
previously explained, its privatization process resulted in highly fragmented ownership, 
which creates specific governance problems. These are particularly acute in the case of 
employee buyouts because share ownership is diffuse and employees have a strong 
incentive to maintain employment. At the other hand, managers with relatively small 
ownership stakes wield considerable power without being effectively controlled by 
shareholders, which provides incentives for asset stripping and self-dealing. Many 
managers (even of viable enterprises) found that generating profits was not the best way of 
increasing their income-instead, they did better by selling assets and products at below 
market rates to related persons. 19 
The slow pace of enterprise restructuring in Macedonia is visible in statistical data on the 
work history of registered unemployment. Since early 1980s, the vast bulk of registered 
unemployed-between 73 and 84 percent-were young people leaving the education system 
with no work experience. Contrary to several countries in the region, there were no 
massive lay-offs in Macedonia (World Bank, 2003a). The saying that the Macedonian 
labour market is a “heaven” for those that have a job and a “hell” for those that do not is not 
far from truth. 
 
The disappointing performance of privatized enterprises is also evident from deeper 
analysis of the aggregate profitability indicators shown in the Table. Analyzing financial 
accounts of a sample of manufacturing firms, Zalduendo (2003) finds a profound difference 
between privatized old firms and nimbler new ones. In fact, privatized firms had a weak 
performance and the recent improvements in aggregate profitability were driven by new 
private firms. The privatized firms recorded a marked decline in operating profits in 1994-
1997 and only partial recovery in 1997-2000, which was insufficient to reverse that 
deterioration. Despite substantial labour shedding, their labour productivity in 2000 
remained below 1994 levels. Zalduendo argues that the predominance of insider 
privatization is one reason for the poor performance of privatized firms. 
 
 
3.2.2  Institutional framework 
There is now growing recognition among economists that market-oriented policies may be 
inadequate without more serious institutional transformation, in areas ranging from the 
bureaucracy to labour markets (Rodrik,2003). During transition, Macedonia has not been 
successful in creating efficient institutions, due to several reasons. Firstly, as a newly 
independent state, it had to build many basic institutions virtually from “scratch”. Secondly, 
it has traditionally been an underdeveloped region. Therefore, it is logical that its 
inhabitants do not possess any “institutional memory” on market based institutions (for 
example, stock exchanges) which existed in more developed parts of Yugoslavia and in 
advanced transitional economies between the two world wars. Thirdly, to date, 
Macedonian policy makers have paid relatively little attention to institution building process, 
which is typical for less successful transition strategies.  
 
Therefore, privatization has failed to boost restructuring and better performance of 
enterprises partly as  a result of privatization method but also partly because of the 
institutional impediments that affect enterprise development and growth. The Macedonian 
experience also confirms that process of privatization risks producing perverse results in 
the absence of hard budget constraints and effective competition. 
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3.2.3  Hardening budget constraints 
While direct budget subsidies to firms were drastically reduced during the 1990s, privatized 
firms continue to receive implicit support in the form of soft credits and wage, tax and social 
contributions arrears. As presented below the share of the non- performing loans in the 
Macedonian banking system has been one of the highest among transition economies. As 
regards wage, tax and social contributions arrears, analyzing a sample of manufacturing 
firms, Zalduendo (2003) finds that they remained high between 1994 and 2000 (in the 
range of 3 to 4 percent of GDP). 
 
This tolerance of arrears mainly reflects slow progress in resolving the loss-making 
enterprises in Macedonia, especially the large ones. Macedonian reformers have started 
transition in the context of the already very high unemployment and that have been 
probably a main reason why they were reluctant to deal fast with the endless number of 
loss-makers. In 1990, the unemployment rate amounted 23.5 percent of labour force and 
in 1997 it was at its highest 36 percent. 
 
 
Protection of creditor rights 
Inefficiencies in the bankruptcy process and weak creditor rights have also undermined the 
imposition of hard budget constraints and slowed the process of restructuring. In October 
2000 the government strengthened the bankruptcy, collateral and executive procedures 
laws. Nevertheless, financial discipline and liquidity of enterprises have not improved 
significantly. 
 
It seems that main problem remains inefficient court enforcement of creditor rights. 
According to Business Survey conducted jointly by the EBRD and World Bank (BEEPS-
2002) contract enforcement in Macedonian courts is slow, complicated and expensive. 
Among the eight South East European countries only Albania has higher costs 
proceedings and a heavier procedure than Macedonia (World Bank,2003b). 
 
 
Behaviour of the banks  
The root cause of financial indiscipline among enterprises is probably the interlocking 
relationship between many of commercial banks and their shareholders-being mainly net 
debtor enterprises. Privatization of banks occurred through privatization of dozen of owner 
shareholders, resulting in fragmented ownership, dominated by net debtors, with a 
tendency to abuse credit rather than safeguard bank capital. 
 
The case of by far the largest Macedonian bank at the start of transition is a good example. 
In 1995, the non-performing loans of the Bank, comprising two-thirds of the credit base 21 
have been replaced in the Bank’s balance sheet by the government bonds. Dealing with 
the stock problem of a bank’s credit portfolio, however, was not enough to prevent a 
resurgence of the flow problem of bad financing to nonviable enterprises. In 1999,when 
government sold the bank to foreign investors, it had to recapitalize the bank again, by 
issuing Euro-denominated bonds in exchange for the four largest borrower’s bad debts 
amounting to EUR 120 million. Such behaviour of the banks was also a result of the 
government’s failure to address the issue of loss-making enterprises.  
 
 
3.2.4  Improving competition  
As we have seen before, Macedonia has liberal foreign trade regime, domestic prices are 
generally free, and turnover (exit and entrance) of the firms is rather high. In other words, 
firms are exposed to strong competitive pressures, which is likely to improve their 
performance. 
 
However, one important aspect of competition policy in Macedonia has been so far largely 
neglected-protection of small and growing private firms from the possible anti-competitive 
policies of large state or privatized enterprises (anti-monopolistic policy). For that reason, 
until recently (end of 1999) Macedonia constantly received the lowest possible grade for its 
competition policy (score 1 according to the EBRD ranking of transition economies). After 
that, finally, The Law against limiting of competition was enacted and the Monopoly Office 
was established. 
 
Despite these legislative changes, significant actions against monopolistic behaviour and 
abuse of market power have not been observed, although media and anecdotal evidence 
offer many examples of anti competitive behaviour. The most probable reasons are a 
combination of complicated legislation and inadequate enforcement mechanism. The Law 
is considered to be too extensive and complicated and the Monopoly Office is de facto and 
de jure dependent on the Ministry of Economy. 
 
An important source of unfair competition is a big informal sector, which is estimated to be 
around 40 percent of official GDP.A large size of the informal sector reflects a weak 
institutional framework and high costs of doing business in Macedonia. Therefore, bringing 
the informal sector into the formal economy will require significant improvement of the 
quality of Macedonian institutions, which is likely to be a long-run process. 
 
 
3.3 Financial sector reforms 
In contrast to other command economies, Macedonia, within the former Yugoslav 
Federation, has had a two-tier banking system since 1964. Extending credit and collecting 22 
deposits were the main bank activities in pre-transition period. The features of the banking 
industry were in accordance to the main characteristics of the economic system based on 
associated labour. The main function of a bank was not to make profit by undertaking 
calculated risks, but to extend as much credit as possible to enterprises at the lowest 
possible interest rate. Borrowing from the banking industry at significantly negative real 
interest rates in the period of high inflation, with intention not to repay the loan has a 
treatment as subsidy. Banks were perceived as institutions for subsidizing enterprises. This 
was emphasized through the programme of selective credits supported by the Central 
Bank. In addition to banks, insurance companies were in existence, only.  
 
A universal type banking system was inaugurated after the monetary independence (April 
1992). Banks were defined as institutions that collect deposits and extend credits in order 
to make profit. However, it was stipulated that they had to be solvent and liquid, and other 
supervisory standards were prescribed for the first time. The Central Bank undertook the 
role of banking supervision. The low standards for entering banking industry had 
contributed to rapid increase of the number of banks. From four banks before 
independence, in 1993 they increased to 19. The record was reached in 1998 – 24. The 
new established banks had the same defect function of performance as the old banks. 
They were established primarily from domestic non-financial companies that did not have 
any expertise in financial operations. In the most of cases, the main goal of the 
shareholders of newly established banks, were to attract funds for financing their own 
businesses. Thus, the newly established banks from the beginning had ill-corporate 
governance and distorted operation function. 
 
The structure of the financial system remained simple even in the matured transition 
phase. The dominance of the banks within the financial system remained during the whole 
transition period. In 2002 they accounted for 96.5 percent of total financial transactions. 
Other bank like financial institutions consist of saving houses. They are small financial 
intermediaries that can collect deposits and extend loans to households. They account for 
1.8 percent of total financial transaction. A compulsory deposit insurance scheme was 
established in 1996. The scheme is insuring only household deposits up to Euro 20,000. 
Apart from state own health insurance fund and pension fund, which have been functioning 
as pay as you go systems, private investment funds have not been established (see table 
13 in the Appendix). 
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3.3.1  Financial restructuring of the banking sector  
The restructuring of the banking system started in 1995 with big delay. Mainly, soft loans 
seeking groups (individuals and enterprises) through borrowing from state owned banks 
with intention not to repay loans, were prolonging financial sector reforms. Due to this 
financial reforms started only as financial restructuring
6 of the banking system. The 
operational restructuring
7 of the industry was put in halt. 
 
The main goal of financial restructuring of the banking system was to clean up the bad 
loans from the portfolio of the old banks. The costs of the rehabilitation were extremely 
high. Total costs reached 42.3 percent of GDP, out of which 12.1 percent refers to the 
cleaning of bad loans from the balance sheet of the banks, and 30.2 percent refer to the 
costs for payment of foreign currency deposits of households, deposited in the banking 
industry before 1992. Thus, soft loans from old banks that were playing a role of implicit 
government subsidy de facto became explicit government subsidies. This was, worldwide, 
one of the most costly operations of bank restructuring
8. 
 
There was no special programme for privatization of the old banks which were owned by 
socially owned enterprises. Banks were automatically privatized along with privatization of 
enterprises. Thus, the root cause of financial indiscipline among enterprises is probably the 
interlocking relationship between many of commercial banks and their owners  – 
enterprises that were interested to get soft loans from the banks instead to maximize the 
shareholders value. 
 
                                                                 
6   The main purpose of financial restructuring is the renewal of the bank’s solvency (net worth). The bank could improve 
its balance sheet by inflow of new capital (from the present and new shareholders), by reducing the liabilities (for 
instance, some liabilities to be written off), or by increasing the value of the assets (for instance, by improving the 
collection of bad claims, by accelerating the realization of collateral for bad loans and so on). This phase of the bank’s 
restructuring usually includes government intervention by: replacement of bad claims with government bonds, 
establishment of a government agency for the collection of bad claims undertaken from banks, liquidity support from the 
central bank, acceleration of the privatization process in banks and so on. 
7   Operational restructuring includes: audit of the business strategy of the bank; improvement of corporate governance; 
establishment of sound management and accounting systems; adoption of better techniques for risk evaluation and 
asset and liability management; efficient liquidity management; and implementation of an efficient internal control and 
audit system as a prevention against different kinds of risks. Operational costs in banks could be reduced by the 
implementation of new technologies, closing some branches, opening agencies, and reducing the number of 
employees. Usually this phase begins with a change of management of banks under the rehabilitation programme. 
8   The financial restructuring of the banking system has considerable fiscal implications, with the costs being borne by 
taxpayers. There is empirical evidence that these costs range from 4 percent of GDP in the case of bank restructuring 
in Philippines to 45 percent of GDP in the case of restructuring of the banking system in Kuwait. The average costs for 
restructuring of the banking systems in transition economies were about 8 percent of GDP (the Czech Republic in 
1993: 7.8 percent of GDP; Hungary in 1993: 12.2 percent of GDP; Poland in 1993: 5.7 percent of GDP). 24 
Graph 6 
Non-performing loans and capital adequacy ratio 
 


















The misallocation of funds continued, although the share of bad loans in total loan portfolio 
was decreasing. Non-performing loans level remained high until 2000. Kosovo crisis has 
its contribution in worsening the loan portfolio of banks also. Thus, competition in the 
financial sector remained weak, resulting in low efficiency. 
 
 
3.3.2  Operational restructuring 
Inflow of foreign capital and presence of the reputable foreign banks started after almost a 
decade of transition. This was big disadvantage for the financial sector. The entrance of 
the first foreign reputable bank was in 2000. This initiated process of operational 
restructuring of the banking industry. The largest bank – Stopanska Banka Skopje, was 
sold to three foreign reputable institutional investors: National Bank of Greece S.A. Athens, 
European Bank for Restructuring and Development and International Finance Corporation. 
Actually, Stopanska Banka Skopje, became subsidiary of National Bank of Greece, having 
in mind that it has had share stake of 74 percent. The precondition for this development 
was a second financial restructuring of the bank, which occurred at the end of 1999 with 
the replacement of EUR 125 million of bad loans by government bonds. This created 
additional costs of 3.5 percent of GDP for rehabilitation of banking industry. Another small 
bank was undertaken by Alfa Bank from Greece, and the third largest bank by Nova 
Ljubljanska Banka Ljubljana. Simultaneously, at the end of 2002, Bank of Austria opened 
representative office in Macedonia. Thus, at the end of 2002 more than half of the banking 
industry was in the hands of reputable financial institutions that has had expertise and 
experience to manage a bank.  25 
The link between enterprises  - shareholders searching for soft loans and banks was 
broken. Corporate governance of banks was normalized. Competition and efficiency has 
been increased through the comprehensive reorganization and restructuring, that was 
dictated by Stopanska Banka Skopje. All these measures had increased the soundness, 
efficiency and credibility of the banks, which was reflected into reduction of the bad loan 
portfolio, lower interest rate margins and high capital adequacy ratio, resulting with grade 3 
in classification of banking reform in the EBRD Transition Report for 2002 (EBRD, 
Transition Report, p. 20). However, the inter-mediation and depth of the financial market 
remained low, and from this respect Macedonia was lagging behind to other transition 
economies (see table 14 in the Appendix).  
 
Increasing profitability and efficiency, together with introducing higher transparency and 
larger market discipline are remaining main short-term goals of the banking industry and 
supervisory authorities. Securitization of the economy remains as medium term goal. The 
role of the banks is remaining crucial for promoting high economic growth. Efficient 
allocation of domestic and foreign savings is precondition for sustainable economic 
development and increasing of employment. The challenge for supervisory authorities 
would be small weak banks (about ten almost half of the total number) that do not account 
more than 20 percent of total banks assets. These banks were created as banks with ill-
corporate governance, to attract funds for financing activities of their shareholders. The 
shareholders of these banks do not have expertise and experience to transform them from 
weak to sound banks. Their phasing out from the market seems inevitable.  
 
 
4  Conclusions 
The Macedonian economic transition has been implemented under unpleasant external 
and internal environment. However, due to the small size of economy and unstable 
regional situation, the country was exposed to the variety of external shocks. Due to this, 
the country reformers did not enjoy any “ honeymoon period”. The main internal shock was 
the security crisis in 2001, which undercut business prospects and investment activity. The 
size and frequency of external and internal disturbances did not allow the policy makers to 
fully concentrate on the comprehensive long-term economic reforms. The short-term 
attempts for overcoming unexpected unfavourable shocks dominated their decisions.  
 
Despite this, the first generation reforms: stabilization, foreign trade liberalization and small-
scale privatization were successfully implemented until 1995. The effectiveness of initial 
economic reforms was especially increased with arrangements concluded with the IMF 
and the World Bank. In addition, domestic team of economic advisors contributed to the 
efficiency of the reform process, as well.  
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The second generation reforms, which are focused on large scale privatization, 
microeconomic restructuring and institution building obviously have tended to advance 
more slowly than initial phase reforms. The reasons for weak results lie in the facts that 
they are considerably more complex, require significant implementation capabilities from 
the state and broader social consensus in order to overcome the resistance coming from 
different interest groups in this advanced stage of transition. 
 
During the transition period, the permanent IMF arrangements along with its dominant 
leadership enabled authoritarian approach to policy making. The IMF and World Bank 
arrangements partially substituted for the lack of broad based consensus for the transition 
reforms. Due to t he falling output and increasing unemployment and poverty, the 
authorities were not able to create compensating mechanisms for the transition losers.  
 
All these factors together with unfavourable structure of fiscal expenditures tied the hands 
of policy makers to promote more energetically the capital accumulation and economic 
growth. A major weakness remains the weak institutional framework and especially the 
lack of the firm rule of law. Despite considerable support of the reforms by the international 
financial institutions, the inflows of private capital and foreign direct investment were low, 
while export growth was anemic and stagnant. Due to the delayed transition and high 
social costs there is widespread public feeling of “reform fatigue”.  
 
Continuous institution building, energetic reforms in the financial and real sectors and the 
continuation of sound macroeconomic policies are the only ways for bringing more 
dynamism into the economy. In this regard, the entrance of the reputable foreign banks 
has increased the industry’s efficiency and represents a solid background for promotion of 
other sectors’ restructuring and for acceleration of the economic growth. The process of 
EU accession would give additional impetus for accelerating and finalizing the 
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Output
Gross Domestic Product -7.5 -1.8 -1.1 1.2 1.4 3.4 4.3 4.5 -4.5 0.9 3.1
Industrial gross output -7.1 6.0 2.3 -1.7 -0.1 4.5 -2.6 3.5 -3.1 -5.3 4.7
Agricultural gross output 2.6 7.8 4.1 -2.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.5 -9.8 2.5 na
Economic development
Population (mid-year millions) 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
GDP at current prices (in million denars) 59165 146409 169521 176444 186019 194979 209010 236390 233841 241243 254372
GDP at current prices (in million US $) 2510 3389 4456 4412 3733 3581 3674 3588 3437 3727 4684
GDP per capita in US $ at current exchange 
rate 1299 1742 2267 2225 1869 1784 1821 1771 1688 1821 2289
GDP deflator 542.1 251.9 117.1 102.9 103.4 101.4 102.7 108.2 103.6 102.2 102.3
Gross national saving (% od GDP) 0.3 7.5 14.1 12.4 13.3 15.9 21.2 23.2 14.0 12.9 15.6
External sector
External debt stock n.a. 1062 1123 1141 1380 1438 1436 1378 1518 1771
Foreign reserves 119 172 283 277 287 367 478 714 775 735 903
Foreign reserves (in months of import of goods 
and services) 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.4 4.3 4.2 3.5 4.0
Current account balance  (% of GDP) -3.3 -7.8 -6.7 -7.7 -7.7 -7.5 -0.9 -2.1 -6.8 -8.5 -6.2
External debt (as % od GDP) n.a. n.a. 23.8 25.5 30.6 38.5 39.1 40.0 40.1 40.7 37.8
External debt/exports of goods and services (in 
per cent) n.a. n.a. 76.4 86.3 83.0 95.8 98.3 87.8 98.8 118.3 130.3
Openess of the economy 90% 76% 66% 63% 81% 87% 78% 93% 83% 81% 76%
Employment
Unemployment 24.9 25.6 28.9 31.9 36.0 34.5 32.4 32.1 30.5 31.9 36.7
Monetary sector
Broad money (M2-denar, end-year) 560.8 31.9 5.2 -1.1 13.3 11.1 33.5 17.5 11.3 7.9 15.4
Broad money (M2-denar, end-year) 9.5 8.0 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.7 11.1 12.2 14.1 14.9 15.8
Interest and exchange rate
Discount rate of the National Bank 66.0 16.0 11.0 15.2 10.3 11.8 8.9 10.7 10.7 6.5
Inter-bank interest rate n.a. 35.7 22.5 21.1 18.1 11.6 7.2 11.9 11.9 5.8
Deposit rate 117.6 24.1 12.8 11.6 11.7 11.4 10.7 10.0 9.2 6.7
Lending rate 159.8 46.0 21.5 21.4 21.0 20.0 19.0 19.2 17.7 14.5
Exchange rate den/US $ (end-year) 40.6 38.0 41.4 55.4 51.8 60.3 65.3 69.2 58.6 49.1
Exchange rate den/US $ (annual average) 43.2 38.0 40.0 49.8 54.5 56.9 65.9 68.1 64.7 54.3
Prices and wages
PPI (annual average) 358.3 88.9 4.7 -0.3 4.2 4.0 -0.1 8.9 2.0 -0.9 -0.3
CPI (annual average) 462.0 128.0 15.7 2.3 2.6 -0.1 -0.7 5.8 5.5 1.8 1.2
CPI (end year) 55.0 8.8 -0.7 2.7 -2.4 2.4 6.1 3.7 1.1 2.6
Indexes of real net earnings (1990=100) 75.3 67.6 64.7 65.0 65.1 67.6 70.0 69.8 68.5 70.9 73.4
Revenues and expenditures of consolidated general gov.
Revenues 40.2 43.1 37.9 35.7 34.8 33.3 35.4 36.6 34.4 35.8
Expenditures 53.6 45.8 39.0 36.3 35.5 35.0 35.4 34.9 41.6 41.5
Balance -13.4 -2.7 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -1.7 0.0 1.8 -7.2 -5.7 -1.7
Source: Ministry of Finance, State Statistical Office, National Bank 




Percentage change in real terms
Denominations as indicated
% of GDP
In per cent of labor force
(Percentage change)
(In percent of GDP)























1992 2408.4 M1 755.1 - - 1925.2 14.97 704.5
1993 434.2 M1 268.3 - - 229.6 50.37 236.6
1994 70.0 M3-denar 81.0 - - 55.4 51.26 56
1995 17.8 M1 23.0 - - 9.2 51.81 10.4
1996 6.0 M1 12.5 - - 0.2 52.08 0.4
1997 2.0 MKD/DEM stable M1 9.1 4.5 60.48 13.4
1998 5.0 MKD/DEM stable M1 11.0 -1 60.59 11.5
1999 3.0 MKD/DEM stable M2-denar 11.4 2.3 60.62 33.5
2000 4.0 MKD/DEM stable M2-denar 13.5 6.1 60.79 17.5
2001 1.2 MKD/DEM stable M2-denar 12.1 3.7 60.96 11.3
2002 2.5** MKD/EUR stable M2-denar 7.4 1.8** 61.07 7.9
2003 3.0** MKD/EUR stable M2-denar 9.6 1.2** 61.29 15.4
2004 2.8** MKD/EUR stable M2-denar 11.7
* till 1999 Retail Price Inflation, since 2000 CPI inflation
** average inflation
Achievement Projections Indicative target






































1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
total expenditures 13,384 37,678 37,200 41,396 40,792 41,391 45,613 51,520 65,363 70,378 56,708
capital expenditures 1,185 5,853 5,190 4,338 2,505 2,616 2,957 5,751 7,380 8,221 5,037
final consumption 7,663 18,883 19,819 20,134 20,048 21,476 22,510 22,759 36,349 33,156 27,836
transfers 4,536 10,937 12,191 13,712 14,283 13,862 17,127 19,060 17,434 25,672 21,393
interest 0 2,005 0 3,212 3,956 3,436 3,019 3,949 4,200 3,328 2,443
primary balance 6,745 -1,948 -1,695 2,005 1,665 1,864 4,610 10,234 -9,352 -9,691 -384
balance 6,745 -3,953 -1,695 -1,207 -2,291 -1,572 1,591 6,285 -13,551 -13,019 -2,827
GDP 59,165 146,409 169,521 176,444 186,019 194,979 209,010 236,389 233,841 241,243 254,372
in % of GDP
total expenditures 22.6 25.7 21.9 23.5 21.9 21.2 21.8 21.8 28.0 29.2 22.3
capital expenditures 2.0 4.0 3.1 2.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 2.4 3.2 3.4 2.0
final consumption 13.0 12.9 11.7 11.4 10.8 11.0 10.8 9.6 15.5 13.7 10.9
transfers 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.8 7.7 7.1 8.2 8.1 7.5 10.6 8.4
interest 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.0
primary balance -13.4 -1.3 -1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 2.2 4.3 -4.0 -4.0 -0.2
balance -13.4 -2.7 -1.0 -0.7 -1.2 -0.8 0.8 2.7 -5.8 -5.4 -1.1








1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 est.
total expenditures 65,515 65,352 68,280 73,946 80,678 95,349 99,808 91,633
capital expenditures 4,112 2,577 3,472 4,746 6,327 8,125 8,838 7,319
final consumption 32,168 32,532 34,745 36,956 37,909 51,479 49,127 45,868
transfers 25,715 26,223 26,363 29,077 32,281 31,386 38,265 35,257
interest 3,520 4,020 3,700 3,167 4,161 4,359 3,579 3,189
primary balance 1,019 3,317 364 3,228 10,066 -10,487 -9,975 -1,928
balance -2,501 -703 -3,336 61 5,905 -14,846 -13,554 -5,117
GDP 176,444 186,019 194,979 209,010 236,389 233,841 241,243 254,372
in % of GDP
total expenditures 37.1 35.1 35.0 35.4 34.1 40.8 41.4 36.3
capital expenditures 2.3 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.5 3.7 2.9
final consumption 18.2 17.5 17.8 17.7 16.0 22.0 20.4 18.2
transfers 14.6 14.1 13.5 13.9 13.7 13.4 15.9 14.0
interest 2.0 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.3
primary balance 0.6 1.8 0.2 1.5 4.3 -4.5 -4.1 -0.8
balance -1.4 -0.4 -1.7 0.0 2.5 -7.2 -5.7 -1.7


























Systemic Transformation Facility 1994-1995 24,800,000 24,800,000 36,798,279
Stand By  1995-1996 22,300,000 22,300,000 32,843,572
Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility
1997-1998 54,562,000 27,281,000 37,043,673
Compensatory and Contingency 
Financial Facility
1999 13,780,000 13,780,000 18,777,218
Extended Fund Facility 2000 24,115,000 1,148,333 1,472,123
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 2000 10,335,000 1,722,500 2,247,337
Stand By  2003-2004 20,000,000 8,000,000 11,279,191
Total 169,892,000 99,031,833 140,461,394








Extended Recovery Loan/Extended 
Recovery Credit 1994 55,957,776 55,957,776 83,030,253
Financial and Enterprise Sector 
Adjustment Credit 1995 54,700,000 54,700,000 79,944,680
Structural Adjustment Loan/Structural 
Adjustment Credit 1997 39,240,979 39,240,979 54,462,191
Social Sector Adjustment Credit 1998 21,600,000 21,600,000 29,065,815
Emergency Recovery Credit 1999 36,900,000 36,900,000 49,854,511
Financial and Enterprise Structural 
Adjustments Loan/Financial and 
Enterprise Sector Adjustment Credit II 2000 37,361,863 22,487,783 30,755,751
Emergency Economic Recovery Credit
2001 11,600,000 11,600,000 14,487,077
Public Sector Management Adjustment 
Credit 2003 12,100,000 12,100,000 17,181,428
Total 269,460,618 254,586,538 358,781,705
Loans extended by IBRD         
Extended Recovery Loan 1994 26,957,777 26,957,777 40,000,000
Structural Adjustment Loan 1997 18,640,979 18,640,979 25,871,642
Financial and Enterprise Sector 
Adjustment Credit II 2000 22,161,861 13,387,782 18,310,000
Total IBRD loans 67,760,617 58,986,538 84,181,642
Loans extended by IDA
Extended Recovery Credit 1994 29,000,000 29,000,000 43,030,253
Financial and Enterprise Sector 
Adjustment Credit 1995 54,700,000 54,700,000 79,944,680
Structural Adjustment Credit 1997 20,600,000 20,600,000 28,590,549
Social Sector Adjustment Credit 1998 21,600,000 21,600,000 29,065,815
Emergency Recovery Credit 1999 36,900,000 36,900,000 49,854,511
Financial and Enterprise Sector 
Adjustment Credit II 2000 15,200,000 9,100,000 12,445,751
Emergency Economic Recovery Credit 2001 11,600,000 11,600,000 14,487,077
Public Sector Management Adjustment 
Credit 2003 12,100,000 12,100,000 17,181,428
Total IDA loans 201,700,000 195,600,000 274,600,063
RELATIONS WITH THE IMF 1992-2003
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Table 6
flow stock flow stock flow stock
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0
1994 24 24 0.7 0.7 12 12
1995 10 34 0.2 0.8 5 17
1996 11 45 0.3 1.0 6 23
1997 16 60 0.4 1.6 8 30
1998 118 178 3.3 5.0 59 89
1999 32 210 0.9 5.7 16 104
2000 176 386 4.9 10.8 87 191
2001 442 828 12.8 24.1 217 406
2002 77 905 2.1 24.3 38 442
2003 95 999 2.0 21.3 46 485
Source: National Bank of Republic of Macedonia
in million US $ per head in US $ in % of GDP

























































1993 14.6 -3.3 17.9 18.6 -0.7
1994 7.5 -7.8 15.5 15.3 0.1
1995 14.1 -6.7 20.8 16.5 4.2
1996 12.4 -7.7 20.1 17.4 2.7
1997 13.3 -7.7 21.0 17.3 3.6
1998 15.9 -7.5 23.4 14.4 6.0
1999 21.2 -0.9 22.1 16.6 5.5
2000 23.2 -2.1 25.3 16.2 9.1
2001 14.0 -6.8 20.8 14.8 5.9
2002 12.9 -8.5 21.4 16.6 4.9
2003 15.6 -6.2 21.8 15.6 6.3


















Albania 3 3 8  8  8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Armenia na na (3) (8) 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Azerbaijan na na (3) (3) 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7
Belarus na na (3) (3) (7) 7 4 7 7 7 5 6
Bulgaria 3 8 8  8  8  8 8 2 2 2 2 2
Croatia na na 3  8  4  4 4 4 4 7 7 7
Czech Rep. 3 3 3  3  3  3 4 7 7 7 8 8
Estonia na na 2  2  2  2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Georgia na na (3) (8) 7  7 7 3 8 8 8 8
Hungary 3 3 3  3  3  6 6 6 6 6 6 4
Kazakhstan na na (3) (8) 8  8 8 7 7 8 7 7
Kyrgyz Rep. na na (3) (8) 8  7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Latvia na na (8) (8) 3  3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lithuania na na (8) (8) 2  2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Macedonia na na 8  8  8* 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Moldova na na (3) (8) 8  8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Poland 3 5 5  5  5  6 6 6 6 6 8 8
Romania 3 7 8  8  8  8 8 8 7 7 7 7
Russia na na (3) (8) 8  4 6 6 7 8 8 8
Slovak Rep. na na na 3  3  3 4 4 7 7 7 7
Slovenia na -7 7  7  7  7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Tajikistan na na na (3) (3) 8 8 8 7 7 8 8
Turkmenistan na na (3) (3) 3  7 7 3 3 3 3 3
Ukraine na na (3) (8) 8  7 7 4 4 7 7 7
Uzbekistan na na (3) (3) (8) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Note: End-year observations. Codes in parentheses refer to the periods when the newly introduced national currencies have not yet assumed 
the status as the sole legal tender. The meanings of the codes are: na=not available, 1=currency union (no separate legal tender),
2=currency board arrangements, 3=conventionally fixed pegs (adjustable pegs, de facto pegs),
4=horizontal bands, 5=crawling pegs, 6=crawling bands, 7=managed floating without
pre-announced path for the exchange rate, 8=independent floating.
Source:  Jürgen von Hagen and Jizhong Zhou, “De Facto and Official Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition Economies,” Bonn:  Center for   
European Integration Studies working paper B13, 2002; 2000 and 2001 from Andrea Bubula and Inci Ötker-Robe, “The Evolution of Exchange Rate 
Regimes since 1990:  Evidence from de Facto Policies,” Washington:  IMF Working Paper 02/155, September 2002.
* -- We note that von Hagen and Zhou classify Macedonia as a conventionally fixed peg for 1994, but in fact Macedonia did not fix exchange rates until October 1995.
THE IMF CLASSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 









Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovak 
Republic
Slovenia Average
Average for 1997 - 2001 (in % of GDP)
Total debt 54.0 15.7 5.9 60.2 13.1 20.5 43.5 32.4 25.1 30.0
        Domestic debt 20.6 12.1 2.4 49.9 5.1 7.9 21.7 20.7 14.1 17.2
        Foreign debt 33.4 1.8 3.6 10.3 8.0 12.6 21.8 11.7 11.0 12.7
For 2001
Total debt 51.6 19.1 4.8 53.7 15.0 24.0 42.0 43.5 27.5 31.2
        Domestic debt 17.9 17.7 2.1 38.6 5.4 8.4 25.8 30.4 14.5 17.9
        Foreign debt 33.7 1.4 2.7 15.1 9.6 15.6 16.2 13.0 13.0 13.4
Source: World bank





In % 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average 
1997-2000
Employment growth -4.7 5.4 1.0 0.8 9.0 -6.3 0.6
  of which:
  Exports 10.7 3.2 2.6 8.6 -5.9 -1.5 6.3
  Imports -12.6 -3.7 -0.2 -13.6 7.9 -5.8 -7.5
  Consumption 1.9 2.6 4.1 6.3 -2.5 7.0 3.7
  Investment 1.7 1.3 -2.2 3.2 -2.9 1.6 1.0
  Productivity -6.4 1.9 -3.3 -3.7 12.4 -7.5 -2.9
Source: World Bank staff calculations







































Type of FI 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Banks 7 19 19 21 22 22 24 22 22 21 21
Foreign bank branches 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0
Savings houses n/a n/a 23 22 27 20 18 16 19 17 17
Exchange Offices 0 351 540 729 757 395 341 370 397 396 403
Explicit deposit insurance funds 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Insurance companies 4 4 4 6 8 8 9 9 9 9 10
Stock exchange 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total no. of FI 11 374 587 779 817 448 396 420 449 445 453






















Albania 53.9 49.2 4.9 1.5 21.6 5.7 7.0 35.3
Bulgaria 45.0 31.0 18.0 2.7 19.2 11.7 3.3 26.8
Croatia 87.3 57.5 44.8 2.2 21.4 7.7 6.8 17.1
Srbia and Crna Gora 40.3 22.7 16.0 - -26.0 16.1 12.7 21.9
Romania 29.2 18.9 11.0 3.1 21.8 14.8 2.1 25.8
Greece 155.0 109.0 59.6 1.0 12.0 4.6 5.2 11.9
Euro Area 260.0 96.5 107.8 0.9 7.5 3.8 2.9 11.5
Macedonia (according NBRM-2002) 39.0 24.2 13.4 0.4 2.1 8.8 15.9 28.1
Data refers to 2001-2002
Source: NBG Bulletin for South Eastern Europe and Mediterranean Emerging Market Economies














1993 13.2 9.5 14.7 11.0 88.0
1994 10.7 8.0 12.5 9.8 65.5 25.4 25.0
1995 10.8 8.8 13.0 10.7 26.0 27.1 19.6
1996 10.5 8.9 12.8 10.5 23.5 24.4 17.2
1997 11.1 9.0 13.2 10.6 27.5 33.2 27.2
1998 12.5 9.7 14.6 11.2 31.0 37.4 30.9
1999 14.3 11.1 16.6 12.7 34.6 33.6 27.2
2000 16.0 12.2 18.4 13.8 34.7 41.7 34.7
2001 23.9 14.1 26.7 15.7 45.2 111.6 101.2
2002 27.8 14.9 30.5 16.6 39.0 75.6 71.6
2003 27.6 15.8 29.6 17.3 40.0 79.6 76.6
Source: NBRM
Monetary agregates as % of GDP































In % of GDP 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Macedonia 27 18 21 18 18
Croatia 37 41 37 36 42
Czech Republic 76 67 61 54 44
Estonia 27 25 26 26 27
Latvia 11 16 16 19 23
Lithuania 11 11 13 12 12
Slovenia 29 33 36 38 40
Albania 4 3 4 5 6
Armenia 6 9 9 11 8
Bulgaria 6 8 10 12 14
Georgia 5 6 7 9 8
Kyrgyz Republic 4 5 5 4 4
Moldova 7 14 12 13 15
Romania 8 12 8 7 8
Source: World Development Credit to the Private Sector, 1997-2001










RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS AND RETURN ON AVERAGE EQUITY












Source: NBRM  
 
 
 
 
 